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About ten days ago Alexis Tsipras, the Greek 
prime minister, announced that there was go-
ing to be a referendum, and thus terminated 
the negotiations on a new rescue package 
unilaterally. Since then the euro area has 
been plunged into a wholly unprecedented 
political crisis. Whether or not Greece can re-
main in the monetary union is more uncertain 
than ever, and decisions that can give a new 
twist to the political and financial situation are 
being made almost every day. The Greek 
banks have been closed for over a week. The 
economic data are deteriorating rapidly. And 
yet a solution is nowhere to be seen. The No 
vote in the Greek referendum has not exactly 
improved the chances of reaching an agree-
ment. For the time being the positions seem 
to have become uncompromising. At the 
summit of the heads of state and government 
on 7 July the Greek government was given 
five days and a “final deadline” in order to 
come up with viable proposals for reform. 
Thus the next few days are of crucial im-
portance. At the weekend the heads of state 
and government of all 28 EU member states 
are going to meet in order to decide the future 
of Greece.  
 
This flashlight europe provides an overview 
of the events of the last few days, outlines 
possible scenarios for what may happen in 
the near future, and identifies factors which 
may exert an influence in the short term. We 
are not trying to give an exact forecast or to 
formulate action recommendations. But we 
are trying to shed some light on a confusing 
situation by identifying important patterns 
and some of the salient factors.  
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What happened so far… 
In the week that began on 22 June there were a 
number of meetings between Greece and its 
creditors – the European Commission, the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). There was now only a 
week in which to finalize the negotiations, which 
had been going on for five months, on the dis-
bursement of the last tranche of the second res-
cue package for Greece, which was scheduled to 
end on 30 June. It is worth recalling the important 
dates and events of the last ten days: 
Wednesday, 24 June: Meeting of the finance 
ministers of the euro area. 
Thursday, 25 June: Meeting of the heads of 
state and government of the euro area. The cred-
itors make an offer. 
Friday, 26 June: The sherpas negotiate the final 
agreement that is to be signed the following day. 
In the evening Alexis Tsirpas announces that he 
intends to hold a referendum on the offer made 
on Thursday, and to tell the Greek electorate to 
vote No. 
Saturday, 27 June: Meeting of the finance min-
isters of the euro area, initially with Yanis Va-
roufakis, the Greek representative. After a break 
and a press conference given by Jeroen Dijs-
selbloem, the President of the Eurogroup, the fi-
nance ministers continue their meeting without 
their Greek colleague. In the evening the Greek 
Parliament meets and decides to adopt the prime 
minister’s initiative. 
Sunday, 28 June: The ECB Council decides not 
to increase the ELA loans (ELA stands for “emer-
gency liquidity assistance”) for the Greek Na-
tional Bank, but to keep them at the same level. 
The Greek government announces that it will shut 
down the banks and the stock exchange for at 
least a week, and impose capital controls. The 
maximum sum for cash withdrawals is set at €60 
per day. 
Monday, 29 June: The European heads of state 
and government call on the Greeks to vote Yes 
and not to take the advice of the Greek govern-
ment. Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the 
European Commission, gives an emotional and 
pugnacious speech “to the Greeks”. 
Tuesday, 30 June: Post arrives from Athens. An 
application for a third rescue package is sent to 
Dijsselbloem, the President of the Eurogroup. 
The finance ministers hold a telephone confer-
ence. They tell Tsipras to have the referendum, 
and then to go on talking. At midnight the second 
rescue package officially comes to an end. Fur-
thermore, Athens does not pay the instalment 
due to the IMF and is thus the first industrialized 
country in the history of the International Mone-
tary Fund to fall “into arrears”. 
Wednesday, 1 July: Federal Chancellor Angela 
Merkel issues a government statement. The de-
bate in the German Parliament is broadcast live 
and on Greek television with a simultaneous 
translation. 
Wednesday to Saturday, 1 to 4 July: Election 
campaign in Greece. The Greek government 
continues to call for a No vote, the other euro 
countries for a Yes vote. 
Sunday, 5 July: At the referendum in Greece 
61% vote No, and 38% vote Yes. 
Monday, 6 July: In Paris Merkel and French 
President François Hollande talk about the con-
sequences of the referendum. Finance minister 
Yanis Varoufakis resigns. He is succeeded by 
Euklid Tsakalotos of the Syriza Party. The Greek 
banks stay shut, and the capital controls are kept 
in place. 
Tuesday, 7 July: First there is a meeting of the 
Eurogroup, and in the evening a meeting in Brus-
sels of the heads of state and government of the 
euro area. Greece does not submit a new written 
proposal. The European heads of state and gov-
ernment give the Greek government five days 
and a “final deadline” in order to present viable 
reform proposals.  
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Wednesday, 8 July: Greece makes a formal ap-
plication for assistance from the European rescue 
fund ESM (third rescue package). A detailed ap-
plication is supposed to follow a few days later. 
Alexis Tsipras speaks to the European Parlia-
ment. 
Thursday, 9 July: The Greek government has to 
submit a detailed application for a third rescue 
package by Thursday evening at the latest. 
Saturday, 11 July: Planned meeting of the euro 
finance ministers. 
Sunday, 12 July: Planned summit of all 28 Eu-
ropean heads of state and government in order 
to decide the future of Greece. 
At this point in time it is unclear what is going to 
happen to Greece and the euro area. There are 
three possible scenarios: “Gremain” (Greece re-
mains), “Grimbo” (Greece in limbo) and “Grexit” 
(Greece exits).  
GREMAIN 
Negotiations are a complete success, and 
Greece remains a fully-fledged member of the 
European Monetary Union 
The negotiations begin rather sluggishly, but then 
quickly become constructive. Within a matter of 
days representatives of Greece and the Eu-
rogroup reach agreement on a third rescue pack-
age. The agreement contains credible promises 
on the part of the Greek government to reform the 
Greek state and economy in a viable manner. As 
a quid pro quo the creditors agree to debt restruc-
turing. This means that the debts are frozen in the 
long term and interest payments are suspended. 
A formal debt cut is held out as a distinct possi-
bility if the reforms turn out to be a success. There 
is agreement on the need for an initial review af-
ter three years, and another after five years. In 
specific terms success means that public institu-
tions are able to function, and that the Greek 
economy is growing. The parameters are defined 
jointly. The Greek government will have to decide 
how it is going to reach these targets. As long as 
the debts are frozen, the Greek government will 
not be permitted to incur new debts. In this period 
its expenditures may not exceed its revenues. If, 
after five or ten years, the Greek government 
qualifies for a debt cut, the negotiations will not 
be about a complete waiver, but about reaching 
a debt burden that in realistic terms Athens can 
actually service. Estimates suggest that this 
would by about 50 percent of the present level.  
There is not a great deal of time for a solution 
leading to Gremain. Even if they scale back their 
activities to a minimum (no counter service, 
ATMs do not pay out more than €60 a day per 
card), the Greek banks can only keep going for a 
few more days at the most. After that they will go 
out of business unless they are rescued with the 
help of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
Since in formal terms such a measure is an as-
sistance programme, it would enable the ECB to 
make further ELA payments or to come up with 
another kind of bridging loan. This would buy a 
little time in order to make it possible to attain a 
long-term, political and economically viable solu-
tion: Gremain, Greece’s long-term membership 
of the euro area. 
GRIMBO 
There are protracted negotiations, but Greece 
does not leave the euro area, and a viable 
long-term solution fails to emerge 
A new set of negotiations begins, but it does not 
lead to a speedy agreement. The banks can no 
longer dispense cash, the capital controls remain 
in place, the situation of the banks deteriorates 
rapidly. The pressure on the Greek government 
increases. Syriza, which originally was no more 
than an alliance of various left-wing parties, 
breaks up, and so does the governing coalition. 
The country has to organize new elections, but in 
fact does not have the time to do so. There are 
already some spill-over effects on other euro 
countries, especially those on the periphery of the 
euro area. For this reason the Eurogroup, after 
consulting the European Commission and the 
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ECB, decides that the Greek banks will have to 
be stabilized, both in order to shore up the Greek 
economy, and in order to guarantee the financial 
stability of the euro area as a whole. A bank res-
cue package is put together with the transitional 
government in Athens. ESM resources are made 
available as in the case of Spain. This qualifies 
as an assistance programme, which means that 
the ECB can continue to support the Greek banks 
(with the help of ELA or some other instrument). 
The Greeks have an election, but it does not pro-
duce a clear mandate. The new government, 
which is a broadly-based coalition of various dif-
ferent parties, continues with the negotiations in 
Brussels. However, they are rather sluggish. The 
new government is weak in both domestic and 
foreign policy terms. It is unable to negotiate suc-
cessfully with its euro partners, nor can it rely on 
the broad support of the Greek electorate. This is 
another reason why important reform projects do 
not make much headway and the economy con-
tinues to stagnate on a very low level. The 
Greeks are not convinced by all this, and the cap-
ital controls are felt to be an unwarranted attempt 
to strangle the economy. And the creditors are 
not satisfied either. It becomes more and more 
difficult to organize majorities in the euro area’s 
national parliaments which are required to vote 
on these measures. The negotiating partners 
continue to be suspicious of each other. The EU 
approval ratings continue to sink both in Greece 
and in the other countries of the euro area. The 
euro area is stuck in a crisis mode. That is what 
Grimbo is all about. It is an inherently unstable 
scenario that sooner or later is bound to lead to a 
gradual kind of Grexit. 
GREXIT 
The negotiations founder, and Greece leaves 
the euro area 
Alexis Tsipras – strengthened by the referendum 
and the joint declaration of all of the parties rep-
resented in the Greek Parliament – goes to Brus-
sels. However, he gets off to a difficult start. His 
negotiating partners emphasize again and again 
that they intend to respect the result of the Greek 
referendum, but this does not lead to a significant 
change in their positions. In political terms the two 
sides are even more intransigent in the wake of 
the referendum. The Greek prime minister con-
tinues to press for a debt cut, which he thinks is 
the only solution. He feels even more honour 
bound to adhere to this idea as a result of the ref-
erendum. However, the other euro states are not 
in the mood for concessions. They have also 
adopted a clear-cut position. Assistance without 
unambiguous conditionality is not an option. A 
bevy of meetings within a short space of time fails 
to resolve these conflicting goals. The ECB’s 
hands are tied. Without an assistance pro-
gramme it cannot make any more ELA payments. 
At the same time the economic situation of the 
country keeps getting worse and worse. The 
banks stay shut. For a few days the euro cash in 
the country leads a life of its own. Its value de-
taches itself from that of the euro elsewhere. For 
a short time this has the effect of an increase in 
the amount of cash available, which helps with 
day-to-day payments, but does not resolve any of 
the fundamental problems of the Greek economy. 
Imports and exports are virtually impossible in 
view of the fact that invoices cannot be paid. Im-
portant goods such as medicines and foodstuffs 
are increasingly in short supply. The EU and its 
member states begin to provide humanitarian as-
sistance. The political pressure grows. The Greek 
banks finally go out of business. No economic 
system can function without a payments system. 
The Greek government feels compelled to intro-
duce a parallel payments system with the help of 
IOUs. The value of the new de facto currency de-
clines dramatically, and the size of Greek debts 
in euros multiplies. They can definitely no longer 
be serviced. Either a debt cut is negotiated, or the 
Greek government declares unilaterally that it 
cannot repay its debts. It would be a case of sov-
ereign default. In formal terms Greece remains a 
member of the euro area, but in practical terms it 
is cut off from the euro. This is how Grexit would 
happen. 
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Keep an eye on this 
Recent weeks have shown that forecasts about 
the outcome of the Greek debt crisis are virtually 
impossible. Unexpected political or economic 
events can quickly turn the situation on its head. 
Under these circumstances it would be presump-
tuous to assume that the process can be kept un-
der control or that Grexit can proceed in an “or-
derly” fashion. However, a number of factors are 
worth keeping an eye on in the days ahead.  
Stability of the Financial Services Sector: For 
how long can the Greek banking system keep its 
head above water, and when are its last reserves 
used up? And to what extent will the ECB shore 
up the Greek banking system with the help of 
emergency loans? 
Cohesion of the euro countries: Will the other 
member states of the euro area and the creditor 
institutions succeed in adhering to a single nego-
tiating position? Or will the north-south conflict 
continue to worsen, i.e. Germany, the Nether-
lands, Finland and some Eastern European 
countries are advocates of a hard line towards 
Greece on the one hand, and France and Italy 
are proponents of more flexibility on the other? 
The fact is that without the political cohesion of 
the euro countries the whole euro area is in dan-
ger. Finding a solution for Greece is a challenge. 
But it is also a challenge to protect the other euro 
countries from catching the disease. 
The domestic situation in Greece: Will the gov-
erning coalition manage to survive? Or will the 
failure of the negotiations in Brussels to come up 
with a speedy resolution of the issue lead to the 
downfall of the government and new elections? 
Willingness to compromise: Will both of the 
negotiating parties be prepared to make 
concessions that may well run counter to the 
statements they have made in the past? In the 
case of Greece this will mean far-reaching and 
credible reforms, whereas the euro countries will 
have to give an undertaking to restructure Greek 
debt. This will be a sensitive issue particularly for 
euro countries that have undergone painful 
reforms themselves (Portugal, Spain, and 
Ireland) or that have lower levels of income and 
social protection than Greece (Slovak Republic). 
Or will the suspicions on both sides become more 
pronounced, and will the two sides become even 
more intransigent at the negotiating table? 
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